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Abstract 
Industrial  organization  (IO)  has  an  important  role  to  play  in 
inspiring the competition and regulation policies of the government. 
At the  same  it can  be  used  to  clarify  the  economics  of business 
strategies.  The  idea  here  is  not to  give  a  comprehensive  review, 
but to  draw  attention  to  some  striking  tendencies,  prospects  and 
problems of the field of 10 as  a source of inspiration for competitive 
strategies.  A  first focus  will  be  on  credible  market strategies  and 
asymmetric information, with implications for internal organization, 
vertical  foreclosure  and  markets  with  switching  costs.  A  second 
point will  look at detection of not so  obvious possibilities, as  there 
are  lower  prices  with  cooperation,  disadvantageous  mergers, 
positive  side  effects  for  rivals,  and  disadvantageous  price 
discrimination.  Finally  some  approaches  will  be  discussed  to 
problems  concerning  high  requirements  on  rationality  and  lack  of 
robustness. An  example will be discussed of a search for robustness 
in strategic investment models in oligopoly settings with leaders and 
followers. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND 
THE ECONOMICS OF  BUSINESS STRATEGY 
by 
Raymond DE  BONDT and Jan VANDEKERCKHOVE 
October 2004 
1. Introduction 
The  original  contributions  of  the  field  of  industrial  economics  or 
industrial organization, 10 hereafter, are situated just before the Second 
World War. The pioneers of 10 used very simple theoretical models and 
detailed case studies. The main focus was on  the analysis of industries. 
The idea was that it is often not possible to achieve perfect competition, 
and  moreover it may  not  be  desirable.  Likewise  monopoly  often  has, 
expect  in  special  circumstances  of  natural  monopoly,  more  economic 
disadvantages than advantages. A  search was launched for the lines of 
structure  and  conduct  that  could  define  a  window  of  workable 
competition,  with  better  economic  performance.  An  important 
underlying  idea  was  that  competition  policy  cannot  be  left to  politics 
alone.  There  exist  sound  and  robust  economic  reasons  why  certain 
windows  of structure  and  behavior  are  better  than  others.  The  main 
task of the field of 10 is to find, explain and apply those reasons, taking 
into  account  the  relevant  legal  and  economic  policy  environment 
(Carlton  and  Perloff  (2005)).  And  today  the  mainstream  10  is  still 
traveling this very important road.  A related branch tries to analyze the 
economic  and  political  rationality  of  government  regulation  and  non 
market strategies of firms (Baron (2003)). 
2 From  1980  on,  scholars  at  the  Harvard  Business  School  began  to 
employ 10 inspired thinking  and  analysis to understand and  to develop 
market strategies (Porter (1980, 1988)). Such strategies are focused on 
achieving  sustainable  economic  profits  in  competitive  environments. 
Business strategies can  of course develop along  several  routes and  the 
10 based  approach  has to share influence  with  many other disciplines, 
such  as  strategic  management  and  organizational  behavior.  Five 
competitive forces  were  identified  originating  from  the  rivalry  between 
existing  competitors,  the  threat  of  entry  and  substitutes,  and  the 
bargaining  with  suppliers  and  customers.  The  idea  was  that  better 
insights  into  the  structure  and  conduct of relevant  competition  would 
help to identify generic profit enhancing strategies, such as  low cost and 
differentiation. This approach  was  a  step  forward  compared to popular 
portfolio matrices or learning curve strategies, that were either silent on 
the  link  with  the  competitive  environment or employed  a  too  simple 
framework (Ghemawat (2001)). The 10 inspired approach to strategy is 
alive  and  well.  It is  particularly  strong  in  providing  a  better  logic  to 
competitive market strategies, taking into account the complexity of the 
environment and the organization of the firm (Besanko et al  (2000)). 
The  applications  of  10  have  grown,  but  so  have  the  employed 
methodologies  for  theoretical  analysis  and  empirical  verification.  The 
intention here is  not to present an  overview of the vast and  expanding 
contributions. The idea is  simply to draw the attention to some striking 
tendencies,  prospects  and  problems  of the  field  of 10  as  a  source  of 
inspiration  for  competitive  business  strategies.  The  focus  will  be  on 
credible  market  strategies,  coping  with  asymmetric  information,  and 
detecting  not so  obvious  possibilities.  Problems  that will  be  discussed 
concern the high requirements on rationality, the low operational impact 
of some contributions and the lack of robustness. 
3 2.  Credible market strategies 
The importance of credibility has  been  highlighted in  many cases,  such 
as, for example, situations where market protection may be attempted. 
2.1. Strategies with potential entry 
The 10 methodology was invaded around the  1970's by the Samuelson 
decision  theoretic  tradition.  Rather  complicated  mathematical 
optimization  techniques  (e.g.  calculus  of variation  and  control  theory) 
itvere  used  to analyze  some of the  major pioneering  theories,  such  as 
limit pricing  (Kamien and Schwartz (1981)). This influential theory had 
been  developed  in  the  1950's on  both  sides  of the Atlantic. It claimed 
that incumbent firms would set a  limit price, which is  the highest price 
that  would  not  attract  new  entry  (Bain  (1959)).  This  price  and  the 
resulting  profits  would  be  higher  the  higher  the  barriers  to  entry, 
resulting  from  economies of scale,  product differentiation and  absolute 
cost advantages. Sophisticated decision theoretic models refined and by 
and large confirmed the predictions on  the effects of barriers to entry. 
They also found, however, that firms typically will not want to set a limit 
price.  They  may  practice  some  price  restraint  in  an  attempt  to 
discourage  the  fast  appearance  of  new  rivals,  without  attempting  to 
exclude  new  rivalry  forever.  Short  run  maximization,  with  marginal 
revenue equal to marginal cost, would only apply with blockaded or with 
(almost) free entry (De Bondt (1976)).  This  is  probably what common 
sense  and  casual  empiricism  suggested.  The  more  sophisticated 
theoretical  analysis thus was able to build a better bridge to real  world 
pricing strategies in markets with imperfect competition. Case studies of 
incumbent  pricing  behavior  for  new  main  computer  systems  and  for 
plain  paper copiers,  as  well  as  extensive empirical  work,  subsequently 
confirmed the relevance of these theoretical contributions. 
4 The  decision  theoretic  models  were  to  disappear quickly  from  the  top 
chart of methodologies.  Contributions to a new 10 began to flourish  in 
the  1980's. This  new  10  began  to  employ  heavily the  methodology of 
game  theory,  with  focus  on  games  of  strategy  and  implications  of 
information asymmetries. Old  questions were revisited. Is it rational for 
an incumbent firm, for example, to practice price restraint to discourage 
future  entry?  Earlier  decision  theoretic  models  incorporated  features 
that steered towards a positive answer.  But a game theoretic approach 
of this  problem  provided  different and  richer  insights.  With  a  lack  of 
uncertainty and no information asymmetries a low price can not credibly 
signal iow prices and iow profitability in the given future. It may then be 
better  for  a  rational  incumbent  to  accommodate  entry  and  rational 
entrants will  anticipate this.  A credible strategy for the incumbent is to 
maximize  short  run  profits  and  let entry  in.  The  established  firm  will 
search  for  other  non  price  strategies to  limit new  competition.  These 
include, for example, excess capacity, advertising and patent protection. 
Only  with  asymmetric  information  or uncertainty  could  price  restraint 
emerge. The new 10 thus predicted that price restraints in the spirit of 
limit  pricing  would  not  be  used  very  frequently.  Surveys  of  market 
protection  strategies  used  by  marketing  and  production  managers 
confirmed these tendencies. 
In markets with consumer switching cost a more sophisticated play with 
entry  and  exit  emerges  (National  Economic  Research  Associates 
(2003)). Switching  costs  are related to transactions costs  (e.g.  change 
bank  accounts),  compatibility  costs  (e.g.  software  and  hardware), 
learning  cost  (e.g.  investments- in  prodlolct  specific  knowledge), 
contractual  provisions  (e.g.  loyalty  discounts),  uncertainty  cost  (e.g. 
with  experience  goods),  and  psychological  adjustment costs.  In  many 
settings  there  is  a  start  up  phase  followed  by  a  mature  phase  (e.g. 
computer equipment to educational market segments to generate future 
sales  from  current students).  Customers that are  locked  in  because  of 
5 consumer switching  costs  will  have lower price elasticity in  the  mature 
phase.  But prices in the initial  phase  will  have to be  lower to generate 
sufficient  base  of  locked  in  clients.  It may  even  be  possible  to  price 
below cost in the first phase,  as  the second  phase  allows a price above 
cost  ("bargain  followed  by  rip  off").  Very  high  switching  cost  act as  a 
classic  barrier to  entry.  New  entrants  have  to  set  a  too  low  price  to 
overcome  the  difficulties of switching  and  this  may  prevent recouping 
sunk costs.  But moderate switching cost may encourage entry, because 
post entry profits are expected to be  higher in the mature phase.  This 
is  because incumbents will  react less  aggressively in  response to entry, 
vvhile  the  size  of entry is  likely to  be  small,  since  it has  to focus  on  a 
limited segment of customers that are not locked to the incumbent. 
It thus became possible to understand better the rationale of a wide set 
of  business  strategies  and  tactics.  Dynamic  strategies  on  capacity 
choice, for example, have fruitfully been applied through the careful and 
detailed study of cases  and game theoretic analysis.  At the same time 
it also became clear why non price strategies, such  as  excess capacity, 
very often will not be used in a strategic manner. With large-scale entry, 
for example, the incumbent may lose  a  lot.  Building excess capacity to 
credible  signal  a  price  war  may  be  justified  and  entry  may  be 
forestalled.  But business  strategies focused  on  pre-emption tend to be 
unwise with rapid or uncertain growth of demand, or when capacity can 
easily be deployed elsewhere, when a small  scale entrant has little cost 
disadvantage, or when the incumbent can  easily expand output ex post. 
They  tend  to  be  a  better idea  with  natural  monopoly  situations,  slow 
growth  in  demand,  low  uncertainty,  irreversible  investments,  and  first 
mover  advantages  because  of  a  head  start  and  learning  curve 
tendencies.  All  in  all  successful  pre-emption tends to  be  relatively  rare 
(Lieberman (1987)). 
6 2.2. Credible contracting 
New  insights  into  competition  policy  also  emerged,  for  example  with 
respect to foreclosure  (Rey and Tirole (2003)). In the Chicago tradition 
an  upstream  monopolist could  not extend  its  monopoly position  into a 
competitive  downstream  industry.  Only  one  monopoly  profit  is  to  be 
gained and the monopolist can  achieve this, by engaging in appropriate 
contracts  with  downstream  buyers.  It  can,  for  example,  extract 
sufficiently high prices (or tariffs).  There is, in other words, no need to 
exclude  downstream  firms  from  the  usage  of the  monopoly  input.  In 
reality,  however,  the  contracts  and  the  negotiations  between  the 
upstream  monopolist  and  each  of the  downstream  suppliers  may  be 
secret.  Credible  contracts  may  no  longer  allow  the  extraction  of  all 
monopoly  rents.  With  two  upstream  suppliers,  for  example,  the 
monopolist may only be  able to extract the Cournot-Nash type duopoly 
profits.  With more than two suppliers the total downstream profits that 
can  be  extracted go down further and  the monopolist has  an  incentive 
to limit the supply of its input. 
The upstream monopolist faces  a  credibility problem in  negotiating and 
writing  the  contracts  with  downstream  firms.  (A  monopolist  selling  a 
durable  good  to  rational  consumers faces  a  similar problem).  It may 
negotiate a contract with two downstream firms, extracting for example 
a high fixed fee with the promise that no one else will obtain supply. But 
once the contract is signed, the monopolist has an  incentive to break his 
promise.  Supplying  additional  firms  will  give  additional  profit  to  the 
monopolist.  This  to  the  disadvantage of the  earlier two  suppliers,  but 
that is their problem. Of course, if the downstream firms can  anticipate 
this opportunistic behavior of the monopolist, they will  not agree in the 
first  place.  The  upstream  supplier  thus  has  an  incentive  to  seek  a 
credible promise to give exclusivity.  In other words this firm will seek to 
foreclose all  but some downstream firms. This is done not to extend its 
7 monopoly  power,  but  simply  to  obtain  the  profits  of  its  existing 
monopoly position. The monopolist can  use for this several  instruments 
such  as  exclusive  dealing,  vertical  integration,  retail  price  floors, 
developing  and  maintaining  reputation  for  exclusive  dealing,  and 
limitation of its productive capacity. 
3.  Coping with asymmetric information 
Modern  game  theory  allows  studying  games  of  strategy  with  limited 
information of participants in markets and firm organizations. 
3.1. In markets 
A new entrant in a market, for example, may not be sure about the type 
of incumbent it faces.  Maybe the  incumbent is  "normal" in  that it will 
accommodate new competition, or maybe it is an "aggressive" type that 
will  start a  price  war  as  soon  as  a  new  rival  appears.  Given  that the 
entrant has  information  on  payoffs it can  compute  for what kind  of a 
priori  assessments  it should  enter or stay  out the  market.  With  more 
periods  and  entrants the  problem  quickly  becomes  more  complicated. 
Players  have to  know  how to  rationally  update their  beliefs.  It is  now 
possible that a  normal entrant engages in aggressive behavior, while it 
would not do that in a world with complete information. 
Along similar lines modern theories have explained circumstances where 
it may be  rational  to engage  in  limit pricing  to  signal  low costs  to the 
entrants  (Bagwell  and  Wolinsky  (2002».  Suppose  that the  incumbent 
can  be  of a  low or high cost type and that initially only the incumbent 
knows it own type.  Let the entrant initially believe that there is  only a 
small  probability that the incumbent is  low cost.  A  high cost incumbent 
than  is  likely to  face  entry anyway  and  will  set a  short run  monopoly 
price, to make hay while the sun  shines.  A  low cost firm could practice 
8 some  price  restraint,  but  this  will  not  discourage  entry.  When  the 
entrant thinks that a low cost incumbent is  rather likely, a high or a low 
cost type may both  use  low  prices to signal  low cost.  The  entrant will 
then  learn  nothing  from  this  behavior  and  will  not  enter the  market. 
The  question  remains  whether it is  ever  rational  for  an  incumbent to 
engage  in  costly  signalling  through  sacrificing  low  profits.  It could  for 
example credibly  reveal  a  cost situation through  hiring  accountants to 
certify cost. 
A  position  exists teaching that predatory pricing  (selling  with a  loss)  is 
not rational.  Large losses may have to be  incurred today and  it may be 
difficult  to  recoup  them  in  the  future.  Customers  may,  for  example, 
react to the attempts to monopolize, by supporting higher price victims. 
It may be  difficult to  raise  future  prices  because  they  may invite  new 
entry.  It may  be  cheaper  and  more  efficient to  simply  acquire  rivals 
instead  of driving  them  out;  and  so  on  ...  But things  are  likely to  be 
more complicated  in  markets with asymmetric information (Bolton a.o. 
(2000». For example, engaging now and then, not often, in  aggressive 
pricing  may  help  to  build  a  reputation  for  a  tough  incumbent.  The 
intention  here is  not so  much to drive out rivals in  the  markets where 
low  prices  are  applied,  but  more  to  discourage  new  entry  in  markets 
that are  still  secure today.  Setting  low  prices that smaller and  weaker 
rivals have to follow may also scramble their relations with their banks. 
Profitability then looks less  good than was planned. The banks or other 
capital  providers  do  not know  with  certainty if this  results  because  of 
bad  management or simply bad  luck.  In any case  they will  want to be 
compensated  for  the  increased- risk -and  this  will  indirectly  make  the 
small  rival  a weaker rival.  Or aggressive low prices may render market 
demand  less  high  than  was  planned  and  this  may  lead  central 
management to question the progress of the new business unit. Insights 
into  these  and  related  possibilities  can  help  to  develop 
counterstrategies,  such  as  there  are  coalitions  between  the  predator 
9 victim  and  its  customers  bypassing  the  predator,  coalitions  among 
victims coordinating a defensive strategy, counter:threats by the victim 
to enter the predator's other markets, customer stockpiling, and sale of 
victim's  assets  to  a  successor  firm  if  the  victim  fails.  All  of  these 
practices  may  be  of  relevance  in  "new"  markets,  such  as  those 
transacting  high  tech  products,  where  asymmetric  information  is 
present,  and  where  sustainable  market  structures  still  have  to  be 
determined and reputations still have to be built. 
3.2. In firm organizations 
The focus on asymmetric information in economic theory also stimulated 
a  better  understanding  of  internal  organization.  10  was  traditionally 
concerned  mainly with the  external  market environment.  But business 
strategies also need to fit with the organization of the firm, i.e. with the 
people,  architecture,  routines  and  culture.  More  and  more  10  has 
expanded  to  look at both  market and  firm  organization.  Suppose,  for 
example, one is interested in understanding the boundaries of the firm. 
Firms exist because they can  do certain things better than the market. 
European  firms  may,  for  example,  outsource  production  activities  to 
China  and  other  regions,  while  keeping  other activities  such  as  design 
and  marketing  in  the  company  at  home.  Firms  could  as  well  do 
everything  in  the  same  firm,  but  using  several  firms  and  market 
transactions  between  them,  allows  generating  more  economic  added 
value.  The  search for more added value thus results in using  contracts 
and  organizations.  Transaction  cost  theory  says  that transactions  can 
more  easily  be  outsourced  if they  are  simple,  with  easy  to  measure 
performance,  little  connections  to  other  activities,  and  little  use  of 
specific assets.  And  the  related  theory of incomplete contracts  learns 
that  it  is  best  to  allocate  ownership  to  the  firm  whose  specific 
investments  contribute  most to  the  value  of the  transactions.  This  is 
given that these  investments increase the  value  of the  parties outside 
10 the relationship. If this is not the case it may be better to give access to 
the  use  of  assets  and  not  ownership.  Casual  empiricism  or  empirical 
tests confirm these predictions of (modern) transaction cost theory. 
The expanded new 10 has also been rather successful  in  explaining the 
impact  of  contractual  stipulations  on  performance  of  individuals  (or 
units). In many cases  a  principal  (e.g.  a  boss)  delegates some activity 
to  agents  (e.g.  employees).  In  a  first  best  world  the  principal  would 
know everything all the time.  But such a world entails usually very high 
costs  of  monitoring.  In  a  second  best  environment,  the  principal 
accepts that  he  can  not know  with  certainty  what the  agent is  doing. 
The  best the  principal  can  do, then,  is  to give  incentives to the agent 
such that the agent is willing to work and will do what he is expected to 
do. 
Agency  theory  solves  this  problem  and  confirms  that explicit  pay  per 
performance  incentives  sometimes  can  be  used.  The  intensity  of the 
explicit incentives should  be  lower, the  more risk averse the  agent is, 
the less the agent can contribute to performance, the higher the cost for 
the  agent  of  increasing  efforts  and  the  higher  the  uncertainty  that 
surrounds the relation  between efforts and  performance.  With stronger 
incentives  it  is  best  to  increase  monitoring.  When  agents  have  to 
perform several tasks, however, it is often unwise to give strong explicit 
incentives. Indeed, it is often hard to fine tune strong incentives so that 
all  tasks get equal attention. It may be better to give low or no explicit 
incentives  (e.g.  a  fixed  wage)  or to  assign  different tasks to  different 
individuals.  The  implications  of  these  and  similar  results  for  firm 
organization and human resource management are clear and have been 
well documented (Baron and Kreps (1999), Roberts (2004)). 
11 4.  Detecting not so obvious tendencies 
A good rule of thumb for an economist or manager is to be  very critical 
of counterintuitive insights. They could be artifacts, resulting from some 
peculiar assumptions. Of course one can  not extend this point to mean 
that simple  intuition  or common  sense  will  always  be  the  best  guide. 
This can not be true either, since there is always the possibility that the 
reasoning  overlooks  something  important.  It  does  mean  that  if  an 
unexpected claim turns up, it is best to see  what drives it and to check 
whether or not some slight twist may alter the findings. 
4.1. Lower prices with cooperation 
Sometimes this can easily be done with a little help from IO. Suppose it 
is  reported  that  an  airline  alliance  between  two  companies  result  in 
lower  prices.  Before  and  after  the  alliance  took  effect  airlines  were 
competing in  prices.  Let us assume for the clarity of the exposition that 
no  explicit cost savings can  be  detected  and  that the  marginal  cost of 
carrying  an  extra passenger is  zero.  Is it then possible for prices to be 
lower? Should cooperation not result in higher prices? 
Cooperation would result in  higher prices if the goods of the rivals are 
substitutes, i.e. if the airlines were to compete with output (capacity) on 
the same connections.  But suppose the airlines serve connecting legs of 
a trip and compete with prices. The demand for the total flight would be 
(1) 
with  negative  slope  and  Pi  the  price  of  each  leg  of  the  trip,  i= 1,2. 
Suppose that each  firm choses  its price independently. It then  gives a 
negative externality to its rival.  With cooperation the sum of the prices 
will  be  lower, since the alliance will  internalize this negative externality. 
12 Cournot  already  pointed  this  out  in  1838.  The  complementary  goods 
pricing problem with (1) is the dual of the usual, better known, Cournot 
model with: 
(2) 
and  quantity  choices  Qi  ,i= 1,2.  Empirical  evidence  supports  the  lower 
price  tendencies  for  international  airline  alliances  (Brueckner  and 
Whalen (2000)). 
4.2. Disadvantageous mergers 
In other situations some more 10 reflection is needed. Take the example 
of mergers  (and  acquisitions).  Extensive  empirical  research  and  case 
studies  show that many of the horizontal  mergers result in  lower sales 
and profits, in other words a negative synergy. Consider the analysis of 
a large data set of mergers in the world over a recent time span of 1981 
- 1998  (Gugler  a.o.  (2003)).  From  the  nearly  70.000  announced 
mergers  across  the  world,  about 45.000  were  actually  completed.  On 
average  significant increases in  profits and  reduction  in  sales  resulted. 
But almost 10.000 divestitures were  carried  out and  about 1/3 of the 
remaining mergers resulted in smaller sales and profits. 
Various  explanations  for  unprofitable  mergers  can  be  given,  including 
herd  behavior,  empire  building  of  managers,  difficulties  in  realizing 
synergies ex post, etc. It is well known that looking at a simple Cournot-
Nash  industry adds another-explanatiE)n-;  the reaction of outsiders may-
reduce  ex  post  merger  profits.  Some  relevant  tendencies  can  be 
calculated  for a  homogeneous good  oligopoly,  with  n  members and  m 
firms  merging,  2  :::;  m  :::;  n.  They  reflect  attempts  to  increase  market 
power by merger. A  merger results,  by definition,  in  synergy when the 
contribution to profit of the merged entity is bigger than the sum of the 
l3 profits of the members before the  merger. This  will  be  the case  if and 
only if: 
[(n+l)2 - m  x (n-m+2)2 ]> 0 ,  (3) 
A merger of all  firms, m=n, will  generate synergy.  But a  merger say of 
half  of  the  enterprises,  m  =  n/2,  would  generate  no  synergy.  The 
tendency within (3) is that 80 %  or more of the firms should  merge for 
synergy to result. This result is  also driven by the assumed symmetry of 
the  firms  before  the  merger.  It  can  also  be  verified  that  followers 
typically will benefit from the merger. They only adjust their output and 
reap  higher  benefits.  For  an  industry  with  n=3,  for  example,  this  is 
easily explained.  The merger of two firms leads to a  reduction  in their 
output in  an effort to increase market price. The third firm continues to 
compete a  la Cournot Nash and expands output. The end result is better 
for the outsider and worse for the merged enterprises. Only a merger of 
the 3 firms does generate synergy. 
But  disadvantageous  mergers  present  some  rather  counterintuitive 
tendencies.  After  all  rivals  could  just  sit  back  and  let  others  merge. 
Their  profits  would  increase.  One  can  of course  modify the  results  to 
more reasonable tendencies, where mergers are profitable, by allowing 
the  merger to  realize  cost savings or other sources of synergies.  In a 
more complicated setting, for example, where cooperation of m<n firms 
in  R&D  precede  quantity  rivalry,  one  can  show  that  even  a  small 
efficiency  improvement  within  the  joint  venture,  through  better 
knowledge transfer, would result in synergy and better profitability than 
outsiders. 
But the framework can  also be adapted to allow the merged firms to act 
as  Stackelberg leaders. Two scenarios can be  looked at: 
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act  as  a  Stackelberg  leader.  The  n  - m  outsiders  choose 
independently  from  each  other output  as  followers.  After the 
merger n - m  +  1 firms remain, 
the  merger  brings  two  followers  in  one  company.  That 
company  will  choose  output as  a  Stackelberg  leader together 
but  independently  from  choices  of  k  existing  leaders.  The 
number of remaining followers is  n  - k  - 2  =  (n - 1) - (k+1). 
And n - 1 enterprises remain after the merger. 
Both settings are mathematically identical  when  m=2 is  set in  the first 
scenario together with  k=O  in the second.  With linear demand and  unit 
cost  it  is  possible  to  explicitly  compute  the  relevant  performance 
variables.  This  exercise  suggests  a  number of tendencies.  In the first 
scenario a  merger results in  a  price increase.  The  merger will typically 
allow a synergy, only with m= (n+1)/2 there is no positive or negative 
synergy.  For example,  a  merger of 2  firms  generates  no  synergy  in  a 
Cournot  Nash  industry  with  3  enterprises.  But  if the  merger  acts  as 
Stackelberg leader it has no effect on synergy.  But a merger of 2 firms 
in a 10 firm industry would result in synergy if the merged firm acts as a 
leader.  With  many firms  merging  and  acting  as  a  leader it is  possible 
that  outsiders  do  better  and  so  stability  of the  merger  needs  to  be 
investigated (e.g. no member wants to leave and nobody wants to join). 
In  the  second  scenario  the  merger  also  creates  synergy  (see  also 
Daughety  (1990))  and  followers  do  worse  than  leaders.  The  merger 
results  in  a  price  decrease  if the  existing  group  of  leaders  is  small. 
Otherwise price will increase. 
One  of  the  problems  with  the  analysis  above  is  that  the  choices  of 
output are not subgame perfect. The Stackelberg leaders only correctly 
anticipate the  reaction  function  of the  followers.  But given  the  output 
choice  of the  latter  they  typically  will  want  to  change  their  original 
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change.  But lacking the power to commit the Stackelberg outputs could 
unravel  into the Cournot Nash  equilibrium  and  mergers could  result in 
lower  profits  and  sales.  More  sophisticated  treatments  of endogenous 
coalition  formation  are  thus  needed  and  have  been  developed  in  10 
contributions. 
4.3. Negative or positive side effects for rivals 
Competitive  strategies  will  often  tend  to  change  the  game  that  rivals 
play.  In  case,  for  example,  that  a  firm  decides  to  rapidly  expand 
capacity it may be  trying to pre-empt the market or credibly signal  its 
willingness  to  flood  the  market  should  entry  occur.  Firms  may  then 
choose capacities that are larger than non-strategic profit maximization 
dictate and this will hurt profitability of rivals.  But this, of course, is not 
the only possibility. One can construct taxonomy of possibilities with the 
aid  of a  strategic investment  model  (Tirole  (1988)).  It turns  out that 
firms  may also  adopt strategies that benefit rivals.  Demand  enhancing 
or cost reducing R&D, for example, may create large positive knowledge 
spillover to rivals. These spillovers may benefit the profitability of rivals. 
R&D  efforts  will  then  be  lower  than  those  that  ignore  the  strategic 
interactions. 
Strategic moves  may also  share similar characteristics and  seeing  this 
helps to classify and to understand. Consider for example the practice of 
technological tying. Some software programs work best together; toners 
are  specific  to  printers,  etc...  Suppose  that  a  firm  has  a  monopoly 
position  for  a  product  A.  It also  supplies  product  B,  but  so  do  other 
companies  in  competitive  conditions.  The  monopolist  has  the  choice 
between selling the products independently or tying them (sell them as 
a bundle). The price of the bundle can not be higher than the sum of the 
prices  if sold  independently.  And  the  price  of the  unbundled  B  must 
16 equal  the competitive  price.  Hence tying  can  give  no  additional  profit. 
Thus there  is  no  point in  trying  to  extend  the  monopoly  position  in  A 
through tying to the market B? 
But tying  may  help  to  maintain  the  monopoly  position  in  A.  Through 
credible technological tying the monopolist creates a tendency to offer a 
lower virtual  price of B in  the  bundle.  Price  rivalry in  an  oligopoly that 
supplies  B  will  thus  result  in  lower  prices.  In  other  words,  rivals  will 
have to respond to the bundle with lower prices. In  the presence of high 
fixed cost this may render their economic profits negative. They may be 
foreclosed  from  the  market.  Tying  then  result  in  a  lower  profitability 
today,  for  the  monopolist,  but  in  a  higher  value  of  discounted  cash 
flows, because rivalry is reduced in the future. So  in a strategic setting, 
firms will practice technological tying more than non-strategic reasoning 
implies,  and  this  will  also  reduce  profitability  of rivals.  These  features 
are similar to the ones that accompany build excess capacity. 
4.4. Disadvantageous price discrimination 
Firms  practice  price  discrimination  to  capture  a  larger part of created 
economic surplus.  A firm  price discriminates when the ratio in  prices is 
different  from  the  ratio  in  marginal  cost  for  two  similar  (possibly 
identical) goods offered by the firm. It is often called price customization 
in  business  pricing  literature  (Dolan  and  Simon  (1996)).  Price 
discrimination can take various forms depending on whether it is directly 
or indirectly  applied,  or whether the  different prices  refer to  different 
customers (interpersonal) of'- to the same person (intrapersonal)  (Stole 
(2001)).  It requires some form of market power, a capacity to segment 
consumers,  while  arbitrage  across  differently  priced  goods  must  be 
infeasible. 
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uniform  prices varying  across  distinct consumer  groups  so  it is  purely 
interpersonal.  A  monopolist  can  always  improve  its  profitability  by 
applying  this,  rather  than  a  uniform  price  for  all  customers.  This 
provided  that price  elasticities  (at the  optimum)  differ for the  various 
groups.  The  optimum  prices  follow  from  the  inverse  elasticity-pricing 
rule that states that the ratio (P  - c)/P, with c constant unit cost, should 
be equal to l/absolute value of the price elasticity. 
In  a  Bertrand-Nash  equilibrium  the  optimal  rule  still  applies,  say  in  a 
duopoly where each rival  is  serving two market segments, with low and 
one with high demand. The relative divergence above marginal cost c in 
each segment for each rival  is then equal to the inverse of the absolute 
value of the rivals demand in that segment. The symmetric prices in the 
low segment pL  will  be lower than a uniform price over all  segments pU. 
This price will be lower than the price in high segment pH,  or : 
(4  ). 
And it can  be shown that (pu -c) /pu  is smaller than the average of (pL_ 
c)  /pL  and  (pH  _C)/pH  .  But  this  does  not  imply  that  the  price 
customization  with  pL  and  pH  is  always  better  for  the  profits  of the 
duopolists than the uniform  price  pU.  Price  discrimination  may improve 
but may also reduce profitability in duopoly or oligopoly markets! 
IO theory  describes  the  circumstances  that  make  price  discrimination 
disadvantageous  in  oligopoly.  It  is  possible  to  see  the  non-trivial 
character of this phenomenon by looking at a simple example (Besanko 
(2001)).  Suppose two firms Alfa  and  Beta each  have a  loyal  market of 
500  customers  that  will  stay  with  them  as  long  as  they  pay  a  price 
below 3$.  There is  also a market with 1000 shoppers. Alfa gets a share 
of the shoppers that is equal  [112  - 0,4 x  (Pa - P,s)].  The share of Beta is 
l8 [112  - 0,4 x  (P.s  - PaJ].  Marginal costs are zero.  It is  possible to compute 
the  contributions  to  profits  corresponding  to  a  strategy  of  a  uniform 
price  for  loyal  customers  and  shoppers,  or  a  different  price  for  both 
groups of customers, see Figure 1. 
The dominant strategy is  to price discriminate.  But if all  of rivals do so 
they  will  be  worse  of then  with  a  uniform  price.  So  it looks  like  the 
possibility of disadvantageous price customization is not an artifact to be 
ignored.  Marketing  people  seem  to  be  aware  of  this  possibility,  for 
example  in  the  context  of  coupons.  Coupons  entitle  customers  to  a 
lower price in the store. They tend to segment the market in 
Beta 
uniform  discrimination 
2500  2611 
uniform  2500  1736,11 
Alfa 
1736,11  2125 
discrimination  2611  2125 
Figure 1.  : Contribution to profits in duopoly with loyal customers 
and shoppers. 
a  segment  with  price  conscious  customers  (with  high  price  elasticity) 
and another segment with customers that care  more about quality and 
do not bother to search for the  I~west price (with lower price elasticity). 
Consumers self select to what segment they belong.  But a  widespread 
19 use  of coupons  by  all  rivals  may  result  in  lower profitability for  all  of 
them. Firms will then try to commit to more uniform prices, for example 
through  a  policy of firm  listed  prices,  every day low prices,  little or no 
coupon activity and limited sale frequencies. 
A  similar  unexpected  prisoner's  dilemma  has  been  detected  in  the 
context  of  vertical  integration.  It  is  well  known  that  an  upstream 
monopolist manufacturer has an  incentive to vertically integrate with a 
downstream  monopolist distributor.  This  integration  is  one  mechanism 
(not the only one) to eliminate double profit margins, also called double 
marginalization.  But suppose  one  looks at a  duopoly in  manufacturing, 
with  each  rival  delivering  goods  to  one  of  the  two  downstream 
distributors.  Then  it  may  well  turn  out  that  vertical  integration  is  a 
dominant strategy,  but no  vertical  integration  would  still  be  better for 
both upstream rivals (Wu (1992)). This may suggest that other reasons 
such as a search for exclusivity or transaction cost consideration may be 
more important in real world vertical integration strategies. 
5.  Bounded rationality 
Economists assume that people and firms behave as  if they are rational. 
This  hypothesis  has  proven  to  be  very  useful  to  develop theories that 
allow  a  better  understanding  of  complex  phenomena.  The  level  of 
sophistication  of  the  underlying  reasoning  has  not  declined  with  the 
import of game theory and  asymmetric information settings.  Managers 
could  clearly gain by thinking through the game played with their rivals 
when they design or think about their competitive strategies.  But they 
do  not  seem  to  do  much  anticipating  of this  sort:  according  to  one 
survey,  for  example,  only  5%  consider  anticipated  future  competitive 
reactions  important enough to incorporate them  into strategic decision 
making.  The  most commonly  cited  reason  is  that the  uncertainties  of 
the  real  world  make  it far too  risky  to  base  strategic  moves  on  such 
20 considerations.  But even if this were correct - and there is  no evidence 
that it is  - competitors do not stand still, suggesting that ignoring their 
moves is  not the  answer (Cassiman  and  Ghemawat (2004)). It is  also 
possible that the skeptical managers behave as if they take into account 
other  strategies.  They  may  adapt their  choices  depending  on  success 
and  faiiure  and  may  move  towards  some  Nash  equiiibrium.  This 
argument may rescue the rationality hypothesis when one  is  looking at 
simple Cournot Nash  or Bertrand  Nash  equilibriums.  But it should  not 
give  a  peace  of mind  when  looking  at backward  induction  arguments. 
Experiments  such  as  the  ultimatum  game,  for  example,  suggest  that 
people  are  not  so  good  in  thinking  backwards  through  a  game. 
Education  of  managers  and  economists  using  10  tools  certainly  does 
have a  role  to play.  One  should  on  the other hand  not underestimate 
the possible degree of sophistication in the real world. Years ago, one of 
the  authors  was  approached to  help  with  a  problem  of fair division of 
cartel  profits  between  some  major  European  players.  It  required 
application of some  known sophisticated  concepts of cooperative game 
theory.  What  one  would  think  is  abstract  theory,  they  already  had 
computed and made operational. 
Note also that modern game theory  may provide  new tools that make 
precise  aspects  of  bounded  rationality.  People  may  herd  in  their 
behavior,  for  example.  They  may  act  according  to  a  public  belief 
independent of their private information. But this behavior is  rational in 
some  sense,  it reflect  a  form  of social  learning  and  can  be  explained 
using  Bayesian  updating of probability assessments. The  use of rule of 
thumbs can also be understood better. This can  be illustrated as follows. 
5.1. Rule of thumbs and cooperation 
Cooperation  between  independent  firms  (or  between  individuals)  is 
difficult because of the prisoner's dilemma  problem. It is  best to cheat 
21 on the agreement, whatever the other party does.  But the outcome will 
be  worse if everyone deviates than if cooperation prevails. This problem 
has  been  familiar to humans (and a  number of animals)  for thousands 
of years.  Humans  have figured  out several  solutions,  including  central 
command  and  enforcement,  cultural  norms  and  rules,  contracts  and 
reciprocity, 
Note that a  repetition  of the same  game doesn't make things simpler. 
Suppose the game is  the standard  prisoner's dilemma with each  of the 
two players having two strategies:  cooperate or defect. This game can 
be played in  each  period, where at the end of the period the choices of 
that period  are  revealed to the other player.  If  two  periods  are played 
each  player  has  2  x  24  =  25  =  32  strategies  or plans  of action.  If 3 
periods  are  played  each  player  has  2  x  24  X  216  =  221  =2.097.152 
strategies. With 4  periods each player has to look at 2 x  24  X  216  X  264  = 
285  plans,  which  is  an  incomprehensible  astronomical  number.  Now 
some  of the  strategies  can  be  eliminated,  but to  do  that  one  would 
presumably  have  to  grasp  them.  Clearly  this  is  impossible.  And  still 
most humans feel  that cooperation is  easier with repeated interactions. 
The  reason_  may  well  be  that  people  have  figured  out  good  rules  of 
thumb  (automata)  to  cope  with the complexity of the repeated  game. 
One  rule  is  to  start with  cooperation  and  from  the  second  period  on, 
players  reCiprocate  what  the  rival  did  in  the  previous  period. 
Experiments and  analysis  suggests that this  will  generate  cooperation 
without  interference  of  the  central  authority.  This  means  that  it  is 
perhaps  not  so  difficult  for  firms  to  silently  cooperate  without  them 
forming  an  explicit cartel  like  organization  or authority.  But it will  not 
always work and  hence there are incentives to collude explicitly even if 
it is illegal to do. 
To  understand  why  cooperation  out  of  self-interest  may  work,  it  is 
convenient to look at a slightly simpler rule of thumb, known as  a grim 
22 strategy.  The  grim  strategy  is  also  friendly  in  that  it  starts  with 
cooperation  and  does  not initiate  defection.  Once  the  rival  cheated  in 
one  period,  however,  the  grim  strategy  will  defect  forever.  The  grim 
strategy is a Nash equilibrium against the rival playing grim if: 
Bxf3>C  (5) 
where B is  the advantage and C the cost of cooperation, and f3  =  15  /  (1  -
15),  with  15  the  probability that the  same  game  is  played  in  a  following 
period.  To  verify  this  Nash  equilibrium  one  only  has  to  consider 
counterstrategies that can  be  nasty  or  nice,  or grim.  Nasty  is  always 
defecting  and  nice  plays  grim  for  a  number  of  periods  and  defects 
thereafter.  Grim  then  does  better  against  grim  provided  (5)  applies. 
Suppose, for example, that if both players cooperate they each get 3.  If 
one player cheats  and the other cooperates, the deviant player gets  5 
and the other O.  If both defect they all  get 1. Then B = 3 - 1 = 2 and C 
=  5 - 3 =  2. Cooperation will result from both rivals playing grim if 1 >  15 
>  1/2.  An  equation  similar to  (5)  exists  in  the  behavioral  ecology of 
animals.  It can  be  used  to  explain  altruism,  with  f3  the  coefficient of 
(genetic)  relatedness.  For identical twins, for example, f3  = 1,  and it is 
predicted that they will cooperate frequently! 
5.2. Application to price wars 
To  apply equation  (5)  to  10,  consider the traditional  view that excess 
capacity is  likely to promote price competition. This view is  based on the 
observation that the incentives to cheat on  output restrictions become 
larger if established  firms  can  increase their output at a  low  marginal 
cost.  This is  typically the case  with excess capacity.  The new 10 warns 
that  things  are  more  complicated  (Church  and  Ware  (2000)).  In  an 
industry with excess capacity firms can  also  punish  cheaters with lower 
additional cost. Thus one needs to look at both sides of an equation like 
23 (5).  More  excess capacity  may entail  a  higher cost of cooperation:  the 
additional profit from cheating  is  higher, or C in  equation (5) increases. 
But  at the  same  time  the  benefits  of  cooperation  may  also  increase. 
Moving to punishment will result in very small (maybe negative) profits: 
so  B will  increase.  The increase in B may be  larger than the increase in 
C and then cooperation is  more likely to be sustained (for an  unchanged 
/3).  Or the increase in  B  may be smaller than the one in  C and then the 
traditional  prediction  follows:  excess  capacity  reduces  the  likelihood  of 
successful  collusion  or  cooperation.  The  traditional  view  is  likely  to 
prevail if demand drops and capacity has to be  rationalized. Econometric 
evidence indicates, however, that excess capacity had a positive impact 
on  industry  average  price-cost  margins  in  the  American  aluminum 
industry for the period 1967-1981. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that excess capacity promotes collusion. 
The  results  discussed  above  also  allow  giving  better advice  on  how to 
avoid  price  wars.  Such  wars  may benefit consumers  but can  be  very 
costly. The fare wars in American passenger airline transportation in the 
period  1979-1985, for example, on average involved price decreases of 
only  32%,  lasted  six  months  and  were  limited  to  13  %  of  the 
connections.  But profits of carriers were lowered by $8 billion (Morrison 
and  Winston  (1996)).  Cooperative  behavior is  more  likely when  3  R's 
are  present:  repetition,  reciprocity  and  reasonable  players.  The 
probability of repetition  needs to be high enough and  the impatience of 
the  players  needs  to  be  low,  while  the  detection  problem  has  to  be 
solved.  The  players  should  start  with  cooperation  and  retaliate  when 
provoked, but also cooperate in response to cooperation. The reciprocity 
should be applied clearly and creatively (e.g. indirect response).  Players 
should  also  be  reasonable,  meaning they should  understand the game, 
where  getting  rich  and  not winning  is  important.  Short run  benefits of 
cheating  may not be  too  large.  Players should temper hostile reactions 
through more generous or contrived versions of reciprocity, and should 
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misunderstandings or to start a new game. 
More concrete guidelines may be  relevant in this context as  well.  Firms 
may for example reveal low costs or price matching policies to signal the 
ability and willingness to retaiiate. Or they may use a poiicy of everyday 
low  prices  with  a  meet  competition  clause.  The  customers  will  then 
inform  them  about  lower  rival  pieces  and  the  detection  problem  is 
solved.  If some competitive price moves have been  made, it is  wise to 
avoid  overreaction.  This can  be  done by using  selective  price cuts,  for 
example through changing customers' choices  (e.g.  move to bundling), 
modifying  only  certain  prices,  introducing  fighting  brands,  or  limiting 
price  cuts to some channels of distribution.  Using  non  price  responses 
may also do the job. They include increasing  product differentiation by 
adding features to a product, or building awareness of existing features 
and their benefits, while emphasizing the performance risk of low priced 
options.  And  sometimes it is  better to  give  up  market share  and  start 
new games, e.g. by moving to new products (Rao a.o. (2000)). 
6. Robustness 
A problem of modern theory of IO is the lack of robust insights. In many 
instances mathematics has  become simply a  new language to describe 
particular  cases.  Perhaps  the  richness  of the  economic  reality  at the 
micro  level  makes  this  to  some  extent  inevitable.  Multiple  Nash 
equilibriums do exist and cannot always be sorted out by game theoretic 
refinements.  In  a  duopoly,  for  example,  many  output  or  price 
combinations, improve on the Nash  equilibrium values. It can  be shown 
that  all  of them  can  in  principle  be  equilibrium  if the  game  has  an 
infinite number of repetitions.  But of course this doesn't help to predict 
what  will  happen:  it only  says  that what  will  happen  could  be  better 
than  the  outcome  of the  one  shot  game.  Perhaps  this  is  one  of the 
25 reasons why the practical use of 10 models is  still limited. Does it really 
help to say that we  can  model  everything?  Should  not sCience,  by its 
very essence, cut down on the number of options or trade offs that have 
to be considered? 
It  may  be  difficult  to  choose  on  logical  grounds  between  several 
reasonable  outcomes,  but  perhaps  their  comparative  static  properties 
are  similar.  One  response  then  is  to  search  for  robust  broad  generic 
tendencies  in  several  related  strategy  games.  This  idea  can  be 
illustrated  in  the  context  of  research  familiar  to  the  authors  of this 
paper.  Research  and  development  (R&D)  activities  in  profit  seeking 
firms  have  several  essential  characteristics.  They  are  associated  with 
market  and  technological  uncertainty,  they  generate  knowledge 
spillovers  to  rivals  and  imitators,  and  they  tend  to  change  the  usual 
product competition.  Process innovations, for example, that reduce unit 
costs  of  the  innovating  firm,  will  create  tendencies  for  this  firm  to 
increase  output  and  market  share.  A  number  of  contributions  have 
investigated these features and shown, for example, that cooperation in 
R&D  among otherwise independent firm typically will increase innovative 
efforts  if  spillovers  are  sufficiently  high.  Efforts  will  be  highest  with 
cooperation  and  perfect transmission,  and  lowest  with  rivalry  and  no 
cooperation.  This  emerges  in  racing  settings  with  technological 
uncertainty  as  well  as  in  settings  where  R&D  is  simply  a  strategic 
investment  changing  the  subsequent  output  (or  pricing)  game  (De 
Bondt  (1997)).  Careful  empirical  work  has  confirmed  and  refined  a 
number of these predictions (e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002)). 
6.1. Strategic investments with leaders and followers 
Most of the strategic investment models use a two period setting where 
in  the  first  period  firms  simultaneously  choose  or  cooperate  in  R&D, 
anticipating  simultaneous  choices  of  output  in  the  second  period.  In 
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definition,  lead  followers  that  imitate.  In  addition  investments  in 
knowledge mayor may not be  quickly followed  by  output rivalry.  This 
means  among  other things  that  imitators  may  react  to  knowledge  or 
output  decisions  revealed  by  the  innovating  entity.  And  the  question 
then  is  to  what  extent such  settings;  with  sequential  moves;  change 
tendencies  of  the  simultaneous  choice  games.  To  investigate  this 
problem several  scenarios are looked at in  which firms choose a  level x 
of  cost  reducing  R&D  and  an  amount  q  of  output  to  be  sold  in  a 
homogenous good market, see Table 1 and 2. 
Cooperation  in  R&D  by  a  subset  of  all  industry  members  with 
subsequent  Nash  behavior  in  output is  less  profitable  for the  insiders 
than for the outsiders (scenario 0). A small knowledge advantage of the 
cooperative venture, however, will make the joint venture better for the 
insiders  than  for  the  outsider  (De  Bondt  and  Wu  (1997».  These 
tendencies are reminiscent of the Cournot Nash tendencies. Mergers in a 
Cournot industry will  reduce profits for insiders and  increase  profits for 
outsiders, when the merger only searches for more market power and is 
composed  less  than  all  of  the  firms.  This  is  a  consequence  of  the 
simultaneous choice of all output decisions. 
6.2. Tendencies with leading players 
The other settings of Table  1  and  2  assume that the leaders correctly 
anticipate the  reaction  functions of the followers.  The  computations of 
the equilibrium choices and performance values are tedious and produce 
rather long  equations.  The  numerical  analysis and  algebraic analysis is 
still work in  progress. In tables 3, 4  and  5 some interesting preliminary 
tendencies are reported. 
27 Scenarios 1 and  2  are less strategic in  nature and reflect decisions with 
a  short run character. Given a  new technology, for example, only some 
additional  knowledge is  needed to implement and  decisions on  this can 
be made more or less together with output decisions. In settings 3 to 6, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  long  run  view  brings  in  long  term  strategic 
thinking. 
Table 1 : 2 Period possibilities strategic investment x and output q 
choices in n firm industry 
•  All  firms Nash in x and 
•  then all  Nash in q 
•  k firms cooperate in x 
0  Nash with n-k rivals 
n-k rivals Nash in x 
•  then all Nash in q 
•  k leaders Nash in 
1  simultaneous x and q 
•  then n - k follow with Nash in 
simultaneous x and q 
2  •  k leaders cooperate on 
simultaneous x and q 
•  then n - k follow with Nash in 
x and q 
28 Table 2  : 4 Period possibilities strategic investment and output choice in 
n firm industry 
•  k leaders Nash in x 
3  •  n-k followers Nash in x 
•  k leaders Nash in q 
•  n-k followers Nash in q 
•  k leaders cooperate in x 
4  •  n-k followers Nash in x 
•  k leaders Nash in q 
•  n-k followers Nash in q 
•  k leaders Nash in x 
•  k leaders Nash in q 
5  •  n-k followers Nash in x 
•  n-k followers Nash in q 
•  k leaders cooperate in x 
•  k leaders Nash in q 
6  •  n-k followers Nash in x 
•  n-k followers Nash in q 
Mergers  that  lead  tend  to  perform  better  in  games  with  output 
competition. The incorporation of strategic investments does not change 
this  tendency.  The  counterintuitive  tendencies  of  simultaneous  move 
games  tend  to  disappear:  cooperation  and  leading  results  in  better 
profitability compared to rivalry or imitating, even without better 
29 Table 3:  Strategic investment x and output q, in scenarios 1 through 6. 
The 7f symbol indicates profits, i.e. contribution to profitability. Welfare 
is the sum of consumer surplus and the total industry profits. 
Tendency  DeviationsO 
•  Possible < in 2, 4 * 
x leading firm> x follower  •  and in 3, 5 * 
q  leading firm> q  follower  •  Possible < in 2* 
7f leading firm> 7f follower  •  Possible < in 2* 
Welfare i  with number of  •  Possible  ,J..  in 1, 2, 
leading firms  4** 
•  and in 3, 5. 
° Preliminary, * : Only detected with large number of leading firms. 
** : Detected with small spillovers. 
knowledge transfer in the joint venture. This is a reflection of the robust 
tendency of leaders having a larger output than the followers. 
With  a  large number of leading  firms,  the leaders  may  have a  smaller 
output and lower profitability than followers, in situations where leaders 
choose  simultaneously  investment  and  output  and  followers  do  later 
likewise.  This  may occur in  scenario  2,  where  leaders  have  a  stronger 
incentive  to  restrict  output.  Numerous  independent  leaders  may  also 
30 result in each of them having  lower investments than a follower in  long 
run settings 3 and 5.  But this does not appear to undermine their better 
prospects  for  larger output  and  profits.  Static  welfare  is  only  sure  to 
increase with the number of leading firms given that spillovers are large 
and that they are not too numerous. 
Table 4: Effects of knowledge spillovers on strategic investment x, 
output q and contribution to profits IT,  scenarios 1 through 6. 
Tendency  DeviationsO 
Leader  Follower 
:}.  :}t 
•  Possible l' for 
Overall 
spillovers l'  leader with 
cooperating 
leaders 
Additional  :}t  :}. 
spillovers 
leaders l' 
Stronger l' with  Stronger ,j.  with 
cooperating  cooperating 
leaders  leaders 
° Preliminary 
The  effects  of  industry  wide  spillovers  or  of  additional  knowledge 
transfers  between  the  leaders  are  summarized  in  Table  4.  The 
exceptions detected so far concern situations where leaders cooperate. 
31 Table 5  : Cooperative and independent behavior of leading firms with 
strategic investment x and output q,  scenarios 1 through 6. 
Tendency  Deviations 
Leader  Follower 
x cooperation>  x leaders cooperating  •  Possible < for 
x independent  < x leaders  leader in  1,2*. 
independent  •  Possible> for 
follower in all 
comparisons** 
q  cooperation>  q  leaders cooperating  •  Possible  < for 
q  independent  < q  leaders  leader in  1,2 
independent  •  Possible> for 
follower in all 
comparisons** 
1r  cooperation >  1r  leaders cooperating  •  Possible  >  for 
1rindependent  < 1r  leaders  follower  in  all 
independent  comparisons** 
Welfare leaders cooperating>  •  Possible  <  in 
welfare leaders independent  1,2* 
*: For 1-2 detected with small overall and additional spillovers. 
** :  For  3-4 and 5-6 only detected with large overall spillover and very 
small additional spillover among leading firms. 
32 Larger industry wide spillovers may also stimulate efforts of cooperating 
leaders.  Of  interest  is  the  finding  that  additional  spillovers  among 
leaders  strongly  discourage  followers  in  situations  where  leaders  are 
cooperating. Joint ventures and alliances on R&D  may thus be  bad  news 
for followers. This suggests that the latter may have a strong interest to 
react, but this feature is not looked at here. 
Some  effects  of  cooperating  leaders  are  reported  in  table  5.  With 
simultaneous choices cooperation tend to in larger R&D  efforts only with 
large spillovers.  But cooperating  leaders typically will  invest more than 
with independent behavior even if spillovers are less important. And  for 
followers the reverse applies:  they will  put more effort in  case  leaders 
act  independently.  But  with  large  spillovers  they  may  also  perform 
more  if  leaders  cooperate  than  if they  act  independently.  A  detailed 
study of the main tendencies and deviations for the followers is probably 
useful. 
7.  Conclusion 
The  most  influential  ideas  in  10  have  emerged,  in  cases  where  deep 
insights  could  later  be  subjected  to  more  sophisticated  analysis.  The 
concept  of  the  Nash  equilibrium  and  some  of  its  refinements,  have 
greatly  enlarged  and  enriched  the  box  with  tools  to  analyze  firm  and 
market organizations. A discussion of some of the many striking results 
gives  convincing  evidence on  the possibilities of using  the new 10 as  a 
basis for the understanding of the economics of business strategies. In 
the future more attention could  be given to behavioral approaches (with 
some  bounded  rationality)  and  to  the  search  for  more  robust 
tendencies.  This  in  itself could  enhance the  operational  significance  of 
the field. 
33 An  effort  in  this  spirit  relates  to  strategic  investment  models,  where 
strategic  R&D  efforts  and  output  decisions  are  analyzed  in  oligopoly 
settings.  Some  of  the  tendencies  on  lower  profitability  and  lower 
investment efforts with R&D  cooperation that earlier models suggested, 
were  found  to  be  a  consequence  of  their  simultaneous  move 
assumptions.  These  tendencies  tend  to  disappear  in  settings  where 
cooperating  or independent innovative  firms  are  leading  and  imitation 
follows.  Hopefully therefore,  also this example can  convince the reader 
of  this  paper,  that  a  large  effort  to  develop  a  little  more  10,  can 
highlight important aspects of firm business strategies. 
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